Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

--- script:x509_ext_c2 [2018/02/08 23:46] – [The Full Text Search FTS Document] veera
+++ script:x509_ext_c2 [2018/02/09 00:01] (current) – [Analysing the sample PCAP in Trisul] veera
@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 I saw a couple of blogs about a new way to create a C2 (Command and Control) channel using X.509 Certificates. This technique is described in //Abusing X.509 Certificates for Covert Data Exchange// ((Dark Reading https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/abusing-x509-digital-certificates-for-covert-data-exchange/d/d-id/1330984?_mc=sm_dr&hootPostID=a10970e131beaf9b5a7ac86b0564b114))  and the original link on the //Fidelis Blog Whats missing is in front of us// ((Fidelis Security Blog https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2018/02/exposing-x509-vulnerabilities)) and also on the //Network Miner blog Examining a X.509 Covert Channel// (( Network Miner blog post https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2018/02/exposing-x509-vulnerabilities )) I'd also like to mention the author [[https://twitter.com/sysopfb|Jason Reaves]]
-In this technique the covert channel is built by stuffing chunks of data into  X.509 Certificate Extensions, in this case the "Subject Key Identifier" aka SKI extension. This is usually a hash of 20 bytes.  However this is not used in certificate validation and it appears from the researchers that the network defenses are not checking if this contains a valid value.  The C2 POC uses a large number of certificates with SKI values of 10,000 bytes !
+In this technique the covert channel is built by stuffing chunks of data into  X.509 Certificate Extensions, in this case the "Subject Key Identifier" aka SKI extension. This is usually a hash of 20 bytes.  However this is not used in certificate validation and it appears current commercial network defenses are not checking if this contains a valid value.  The C2 POC uses a large number of certificates with SKI values of 10,000 bytes !
-Detecting this is quite easy with Trisul as well as Bro IDS. This post highlights the different approaches taken.
+Detecting this is quite easy with [[https://trisul.org/docs/lua|Trisul]] as well as [[https://www.bro.org/|Bro IDS]]. This post highlights the Trisul approach.
-===== The Full Text Search FTS Document =====
+===== Trisul vs Bro approaches to the same problem  =====
 Trisul extracts metadata from network traffic and makes them available to LUA Scripts. There are two //streams// your scripts can plug into.
-  - the **Resource** stream:  these are shorter summaries of the meta data. For example the DNS Resources would be one line summary of question and answers
+  - the **Resource** stream:  these are shorter summaries of the meta data. For example the DNS Resources would be one line summary of question and answers. SSL Resources contain the DER format certificate chain.
-  - the **FTS** stream: a complete text dump of the meta data. The DNS FTS stream would be a full dump of all DNS fields - much like the DIG format. Similarly for SSL Certificates, the FTS stream passes text documents that mirror the `openssl x509` command.
+  - the **FTS** stream: a complete text dump in some canonical format. For example : The DNS FTS stream would contain documents with a full dump of all DNS fields - much like the DIG format. Similarly for SSL Certificates, the FTS stream passes text documents that mirror the `openssl x509` command.
-You can see the **different approach taken by Trisul NSM compared to Bro IDS**. Instead of fine grained events, Trisul provides a text document.
+You can see the **different approach taken by Trisul NSM compared to Bro IDS**. Instead of fine grained events preferred by Bro IDS, Trisul provides a text document.  If you wanted to parse the document yourself, you can do that as well using LuaJIT FFI. Here is an example of FFI'ing [[https://github.com/trisulnsm/trisul-scripts/blob/master/lua/backend_scripts/roca/roca.lua|into the OpenSSL  BIGNUM library]] from a script
 ==== Analysing the sample PCAP in Trisul ====
@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
-Next you have to write a small LUA script that plugs into the FTS Stream. Your script will  then get a chance to process each certificate //out of the fast packet path//. The Trisul LUA API provides the [[https://www.trisul.org/docs/lua/fts_monitor.html|FTS Monitor script]] for exactly this purpose.
+Next you have to write a small LUA script that plugs into the FTS SSL Certs Stream. Your script will then get a chance to peek at each certificate //out of the fast packet path//.  By moving this out of the //Fast Packet Path// ((For more on Fast Path and Slow Path in Trisul LUA API see [[https://www.trisul.org/docs/lua/basics.html#stream_processing|"Stream Processing"]])) Trisul gives your scripts a large time budget a few seconds to process without incurring packet loss.  The Trisul LUA API provides the [[https://www.trisul.org/docs/lua/fts_monitor.html|FTS Monitor script]] for exactly this purpose.
-I just put together a quick [[https://github.com/trisulnsm/trisul-scripts/blob/master/lua/backend_scripts/fts/c2-x509-fts.lua|FTS Monitor LUA script on GitHub]] that demonstrates how you can pick apart the cert using simple regex.  The snippet is shown below
+I just put together a quick [[https://github.com/trisulnsm/trisul-scripts/blob/master/lua/backend_scripts/fts/c2-x509-fts.lua|FTS Monitor LUA script on GitHub]] that demonstrates how you can pick apart the cert using a simple regex. The snippet is shown below
 <code lua>
@@ Line 47: / Line 47: @@
   - Use a Regex to capture the bytestring in // X509v3 Subject Key//
-  - If above 32 characters then we suspect something fishy , you can also generate an alert at this point using the ''engine:add_alert(..)'' method.
+  - If the SKI extension is greater than 32 characters then we suspect something fishy. You may even generate an alert at this point using the ''engine:add_alert(..)'' method.
   - Open a tmp file the convert the hex to binary and dump the contents there.
-If you place this script in the LUA folder ''/usr/local/etc/trisul-probe/plugins/lua'' and re-ran the PCAP file, then you would get a number of files in the tmp folder containing chunks of the Mimikatz binary. Then when you run the //file// command you can see the chunk that contain the PE Header show up. You can also do this as part of the script itself.
+If you place this script in the LUA folder ''/usr/local/etc/trisul-probe/plugins/lua'' and re-run the PCAP file, then you would get a number of files in the tmp folder containing chunks of the Mimikatz binary. When you run the //file// command you can see the chunk that contain the PE Header show up. You can also do this as part of the script itself.
 {{:script:mimi1.png|}}